Contracts · practice · updated 2026-10-21

Contracts Practice Exam

The Contracts practice exam tests distinctions that can change an answer even when the general rule is familiar. Its 74 questions separate acceptance from warranty terms, a supported option from a gratuitous deadline, and substantial performance from compliance with an express condition. Each answer explains all four choices and identifies authority. Three timed essays add missing facts that an answer must acknowledge instead of assume. In the bakery problem, $120,000 of catering revenue is different from the claimed $30,000 net profit, and delayed efforts to rent a substitute may affect recovery. Write each essay before opening its model, then use the 20-point rubric to identify which legal step or factual application your answer omitted.

Contracts practice exam: 74 multiple-choice questions

Choose an answer, then check it. Questions follow the outline order.

Question 1 · Sources of contract law

A domestic sale of movable office chairs is governed by a state's enacted UCC Article 2. The parties dispute a formation issue that an applicable Article 2 section directly resolves.

A student finds a different general rule in a Restatement illustration. Which authority controls that issue?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: B.

Authority: UCC § 2-102; UCC § 1-103

  • A. Wrong. A Restatement is not legislation enacted by Congress. It cannot displace an applicable state statute.
  • B. Correct. The governing state's enacted statute supplies the controlling rule. Restatements can help explain common law but do not override a statute that resolves the issue.
  • C. Wrong. Publication date does not determine the hierarchy of authority. First identify the law governing the transaction and whether the provision applies.
  • D. Wrong. Article 2's scope is transactions in goods. Some particular rules require merchant status, but its entire coverage does not.
Question 2 · Common law versus UCC Article 2

A contract sells identified replacement equipment with installation to make it usable. Its language and commercial object concern acquiring that equipment. Applying Bonebrake's predominant-purpose approach, which is strongest?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: A.

Authority: Bonebrake, part II: mixed goods and labor

  • A. Correct. The contract's object and terms support goods with incidental labor under the stated approach.
  • B. Wrong. Bonebrake rejected exclusion merely because substantial labor was involved.
  • C. Wrong. The specified predominant-purpose test examines the transaction's purpose, not an automatic invoice split.
  • D. Wrong. The court applies the governing commercial law; it does not transform the UCC into federal legislation.

Review Common law versus UCC Article 2

Question 3 · Objective theory of assent

Lena and Omar discuss a kayak sale at a cookout, agree on the kayak and a $300 price, and sign a note stating those terms. Omar believes the sale is serious, although Lena later says she privately intended a joke. Which statement best analyzes assent, assuming no separate defense?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: C.

Authority: Lucy v. Zehmer: actual and reasonable belief; capacity; equitable relief

  • A. Wrong. The issue is the reasonable meaning of communicated conduct, not an unexpressed reservation. The stem gives no fact showing that Omar knew of a joke.
  • B. Wrong. Context matters, but a cookout does not automatically nullify negotiated terms and signatures. Explain the actual circumstances rather than using the setting as a categorical rule.
  • C. Correct. The facts establish Omar's actual belief and give concrete grounds for its reasonableness. Lucy v. Zehmer treats an undisclosed joke differently from one the recipient knows about.
  • D. Wrong. A deposit is not required merely to manifest assent. The question concerns the meaning of the words and conduct, not whether Omar has already paid.

Review Objective theory of assent

Question 4 · Offer

A land seller sends a form letter giving a location and price, explains that further assent is needed, and warns that another prospective buyer may decide shortly. The recipient replies that it accepts the listed price. Under Lonergan's reasoning, which is best?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: D.

Authority: Lonergan: further assent and preliminary negotiation

  • A. Wrong. Price does not eliminate the communicated reservation of another decision.
  • B. Wrong. The actual language and context determine what the form conveys.
  • C. Wrong. Examine communicated commitment, not a private reservation alone.
  • D. Correct. Lonergan examines the form-letter context and further assent. The recipient cannot accept a power the seller did not confer.

Review Offer

Question 5 · Advertisements as offers

A store advertises two identified jackets for $10 each, available Saturday at 9 a.m., first come, first served. A customer arrives first and tenders the price. Considering offer and acceptance only, with mistake and other defenses reserved, which analysis follows Lefkowitz?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: B.

Authority: Lefkowitz: public offer and invited response; Donovan, parts II and V: offer distinct from mistake relief

  • A. Wrong. Lefkowitz recognizes a public advertisement that commits to a specified exchange.
  • B. Correct. The advertised conditions can identify both the proposed exchange and how acceptance completes it. A separate defense remains separate.
  • C. Wrong. Whether communicated words make an offer and whether mistake permits avoidance are distinct questions. Donovan illustrates the distinction.
  • D. Wrong. The advertisement specifies when the customer must arrive and tender payment; it does not demand earlier notice.
Question 6 · Revocation of offers

A seller makes a revocable land-sale offer with an unpaid decision deadline. Before the buyer accepts, a reliable witness tells the buyer that the seller has completed an inconsistent sale. Under Dickinson's reasoning, what follows if the buyer nevertheless attempts acceptance within the original deadline?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: B.

Authority: Dickinson: knowledge before attempted acceptance

  • A. Wrong. A gratuitous deadline alone did not establish the supported option claimed in Dickinson.
  • B. Correct. The buyer knows of the completed inconsistent transaction before attempting acceptance. The reliable information matters even without personal withdrawal by the seller.
  • C. Wrong. Dickinson did not require the offeror personally to deliver the information.
  • D. Wrong. The attempted acceptance follows notice ending the power to accept; a deadline does not cure that sequence.

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Question 7 · Option contracts

A land seller promises a thirty-day hold-open period. The buyer supplies no consideration, and the writing recites none. Assume no statute, reliance or other basis for irrevocability.

On day ten the seller communicates withdrawal before the buyer attempts acceptance. Under the distinction between a supported option and a gratuitous deadline, which is best?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: A.

Authority: Normile: deadline, no option and withdrawal; Joppich: consideration and jurisdiction-specific signed-recital route

  • A. Correct. The stated facts exclude consideration and the alternative protections. A deadline alone does not prevent withdrawal.
  • B. Wrong. The transaction's subject does not by itself create an option.
  • C. Wrong. A time to decide is not proof of consideration or another recognized enforcement basis.
  • D. Wrong. The decisive sequence is received withdrawal before attempted acceptance. Any writing requirement is a separate issue.
Question 8 · Firm offers

A merchant wholesaler signs its own letter offering 500 hammers at $8 each and assuring a six-month hold-open period. No consideration or other irrevocability basis is supplied.

It attempts withdrawal after two months, and the retailer immediately accepts. Under model UCC 2-205, which is best?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: D.

Authority: UCC 2-205

  • A. Wrong. Section 2-205 provides its specified protection without consideration.
  • B. Wrong. This section caps its without-consideration protection at three months. The stem excludes an independent basis.
  • C. Wrong. The ten-day objection period concerns a different merchant-confirmation provision.
  • D. Correct. Two months had elapsed, so acceptance occurred within the section's protected period. The six-month language does not expand that statutory protection.
Question 9 · Acceptance

A buyer orders 80 blue mugs for prompt shipment. Under UCC § 2-206, the seller promptly sends 80 green mugs and seasonably states that this shipment is offered only as an accommodation. If the buyer rejects it, did the shipment itself accept the order?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: D.

Authority: UCC § 2-206

  • A. Wrong. Section 2-206 expressly provides an accommodation exception for a nonconforming shipment accompanied by seasonable notice.
  • B. Wrong. The goods do not match the order. Both the nonconformity and the accommodation notice matter here.
  • C. Wrong. Without the accommodation notice, prompt shipment of nonconforming goods can constitute acceptance, leaving a performance problem as well.
  • D. Correct. The seller identified the different mugs as an accommodation. This shipment therefore did not accept the blue-mug order, and the buyer did not accept the alternative.

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Question 10 · Mailbox rule

An outstanding offer expressly invites acceptance by mail without requiring receipt. The offeree mails the acceptance on May 3 with sufficient postage and the offeror's correct address; it is lost in transit. Assuming the dispatch approach described in Cantu and no separate defense, when does assent become effective?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: C.

Authority: Cantu, discussion: reasonable medium and effective dispatch

  • A. Wrong. This approach does not require actual reading for a permitted, properly dispatched acceptance.
  • B. Wrong. Receipt is not the default for the ordinary acceptance described here.
  • C. Correct. The invitation and proper dispatch meet the stated rule. That answers formation timing, not every possible breach or remedy issue.
  • D. Wrong. The offer did not demand certified mail. Proof of dispatch and a requirement to use a particular service are different matters.
Question 11 · Mailbox rule

An option expressly requires written exercise to be received by Friday. Assume the governing law enforces that clear requirement and no excuse applies.

The holder mails the notice Thursday; it arrives Monday. Which conclusion best respects the option's stated terms?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: C.

Authority: Jameson, part I: option default and controlling exercise terms

  • A. Wrong. A dispatch default does not erase a controlling receipt requirement.
  • B. Wrong. A mailing service does not change an agreed receipt date unless the contract or governing law provides that effect.
  • C. Correct. Both the specified form and timing matter. The problem gives a clear receipt requirement and excludes an independent excuse.
  • D. Wrong. The analysis turns on the communicated exercise requirement. Jameson itself distinguishes the general default from controlling option language.
Question 12 · Unilateral contracts

An offer expressly invites acceptance only by completing a twenty-mile walk by Sunday. The offeree begins the invited walk Saturday and reaches mile five before receiving attempted revocation.

Apply the section 45 approach discussed in Drennan. Which statement is best?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: A.

Authority: Drennan: section 45 and duty conditional on completion

  • A. Correct. The protection concerns the opportunity to complete the invited performance. It does not remove the full-performance condition.
  • B. Wrong. The stipulated approach recognizes protection once the invited performance begins.
  • C. Wrong. Protection against revocation is distinct from satisfying the condition for payment.
  • D. Wrong. The offer pays for the completed walk, not stated divisible mileage. No independent restitution claim is established merely by this arithmetic.
Question 13 · Bilateral contracts

A retailer orders 40 desks for prompt shipment. No words or circumstances restrict how the seller may accept. The seller promptly informs the retailer that it is committing to ship all forty desks the following day. Under UCC § 2-206, must the seller ship before a contract can form?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: A.

Authority: UCC § 2-206

  • A. Correct. Section 2-206 allows acceptance of an order for prompt shipment through a prompt promise to ship. Performance remains due, but shipment is not a prerequisite to formation on these facts.
  • B. Wrong. The default provision permits a promise to ship as well as shipment. The offer did not unambiguously require performance alone.
  • C. Wrong. A promise can accept an offer that invites it. Do not confuse formation with completion of the promised act.
  • D. Wrong. The problem does not state that payment occurred, and advance payment is not necessary to the acceptance described here.
Question 14 · Silence as acceptance

A consultant sends a business an unsolicited offer stating that no reply within ten days will mean acceptance. The business has no prior dealings with the consultant, takes no services and does nothing indicating agreement. Does the consultant's announcement alone bind it?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: D.

Authority: McDaniel, analysis: limited prior-dealings exception

  • A. Wrong. The announcement alone does not establish the offeree's assent.
  • B. Wrong. The context matters; the stem excludes dealings, benefit-taking and other conduct supporting assent.
  • C. Wrong. The question is whether agreement was manifested, not a universal two-signature rule.
  • D. Correct. McDaniel recognizes a limited contextual exception, not a power to impose a contract by an unsolicited declaration.
Question 15 · Mirror image rule

In a land sale governed by the common-law approach in Normile v. Miller, the seller returns the buyer's offer with a required larger down payment and a shorter repayment period. The buyer has not agreed to those changes.

What is the seller's response?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: C.

Authority: Normile v. Miller, 326 S.E.2d 11 (N.C. 1985), Part I

  • A. Wrong. A signature does not eliminate the material changes to the proposed exchange.
  • B. Wrong. Nothing in these facts makes the buyer's silence acceptance of the changed bargain.
  • C. Correct. The required payment changes condition the seller's assent on a different bargain. Normile treats that response as a counteroffer and rejection, not an acceptance of the initial offer.
  • D. Wrong. The transaction concerns land, and the question specifies the common-law approach. Article 2's merchant firm-offer rule does not supply the answer.
Question 16 · Battle of the forms (UCC 2-207)

Merchants agree orally on a sale with warranty protection, but a later package disclaims it. The buyer never assents to the disclaimer and both parties perform; assume the disclaimer materially alters their agreement. Under Step-Saver's 2-207 analysis, which statement is best?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: B.

Authority: UCC 2-207: acceptance, proposed terms and performance; Dorton: oral offers, confirmations and conditional assent; Step-Saver: disputed license, material alteration and remand

  • A. Wrong. The UCC rejects automatic adoption of the last form.
  • B. Correct. On the assumed material alteration and absent assent, the disclaimer does not enter. Any underlying warranty and breach still require proof.
  • C. Wrong. Merchant status does not eliminate the statutory exclusions.
  • D. Wrong. The parties' performance establishes a contract; the disputed issue is its terms.

Review Battle of the forms (UCC 2-207)

Question 17 · Battle of the forms (UCC 2-207)

A merchant seller clearly refuses acceptance unless the buyer assents to a warranty disclaimer. The buyer never assents, orally, in writing or otherwise, but the seller nevertheless ships and the buyer receives and pays for the goods. Assuming the communications did not form a contract, what supplies its terms?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: B.

Authority: UCC 2-207: acceptance, proposed terms and performance; Dorton: oral offers, confirmations and conditional assent; Step-Saver: disputed license, material alteration and remand

  • A. Wrong. Taking delivery does not automatically adopt the seller's disputed disclaimer.
  • B. Correct. The assumed failure of the communications leads to the conduct route, which retains agreed terms and statutory supplements.
  • C. Wrong. Subsection (3) does not automatically select the first form either.
  • D. Wrong. Mutual performance can recognize a contract despite the failed written exchange.

Review Battle of the forms (UCC 2-207)

Question 18 · Consideration

An aunt signs a note reciting value received. The parties agree she intended a gift and requested no act or promise in exchange. Which is the best consideration analysis?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: D.

Authority: Dougherty: gift and rebutted recital

  • A. Wrong. Dougherty treats the recital as rebuttable rather than a substitute for an actual exchange.
  • B. Wrong. The problem is absence of an exchange, not the amount promised.
  • C. Wrong. A desired gift is not a requested performance or return promise.
  • D. Correct. The admitted gift facts supply no bargain, even though the form recites value. Any separate reliance claim requires additional analysis.

Review Consideration

Question 19 · Bargained-for exchange

A grandmother promises a graduation gift. The parties agree she requested no attendance, forbearance or other act in exchange; graduation is only the occasion for receiving the gift.

No reliance theory is asserted. What follows under the bargain requirement?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: A.

Authority: Hamer: requested exchange within a family; Dougherty: gift despite recital; Kirksey: condition of a gift distinguished from a bargain

  • A. Correct. The agreed facts describe a condition of receiving a gift, not a performance sought as its price.
  • B. Wrong. Hamer shows that a requested exchange between relatives can supply consideration.
  • C. Wrong. Dougherty treats the gift facts as capable of rebutting a recital.
  • D. Wrong. Effort matters only through the actual exchange analysis; the problem expressly excludes a requested return.
Question 20 · Past consideration

Without a prior request or agreement, Tomas voluntarily plows Nia's driveway. After the work is complete, she promises $500 in gratitude. Considering bargained-for consideration only, with statutory, material-benefit and restitution theories reserved, which is best?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: C.

Authority: Mills: prior unrequested services and later promise; Webb: distinct material-benefit analysis

  • A. Wrong. Spoken form does not answer whether there was an exchange.
  • B. Wrong. The chronology and absence of a prior request matter.
  • C. Correct. The completed act did not result from a bargain for this later promise. Other theories were expressly reserved rather than decided.
  • D. Wrong. The parties' relationship does not prevent an actual requested exchange.
Question 21 · Preexisting duty rule

A roofer agrees to replace a roof for $12,000 but halfway through, with no unexpected problem, threatens to stop unless paid $15,000. The homeowner, who cannot find another roofer, agrees but pays only $12,000 after completion. At common law, is she liable for the extra $3,000?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: C.

Authority: Alaska Packers: unchanged duty and coerced wage demand; Angel: fair voluntary change and unanticipated burden; UCC 2-209: consideration, writing and waiver

  • A. Wrong. Agreement alone is not enough; these facts also lack the unanticipated circumstances and fairness supporting Angel's exception, and the stop-work threat raises voluntariness concerns.
  • B. Wrong. A promise of unchanged performance does not automatically supply a new exchange for higher pay.
  • C. Correct. The roofer gave nothing new, and no unforeseen circumstance is present. The preexisting duty rule makes the promise unenforceable.
  • D. Wrong. Oral modifications are not always void. The reason here is lack of consideration.

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Question 22 · Contract modification

A goods supplier and bakery agree to a price increase during a genuine shortage. Assume actual assent, good faith, signatures satisfying every applicable formality and no remaining defense. Under UCC 2-209(1), is new consideration additionally necessary?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: A.

Authority: UCC 2-209

  • A. Correct. The stem separately supplies assent, good faith and required form; subsection (1) removes the additional consideration requirement.
  • B. Wrong. That contradicts the provision.
  • C. Wrong. The section permits modification subject to its requirements and other governing limits.
  • D. Wrong. A shortage is not itself an agreement. The hypothetical expressly establishes an agreed modification.
Question 23 · Accord and satisfaction

A homeowner owes a painter a fee, but they dispute the amount in good faith. The homeowner in good faith tenders a $500 check with a conspicuous full-satisfaction statement covering that disputed fee. The painter obtains payment.

Assume the claim is subject to a bona fide dispute, UCC 3-311 applies, and no subsection (c) or other exception preserves it. Which is best?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: D.

Authority: UCC 3-311

  • A. Wrong. The section does not add that separate-signature condition to the stated requirements.
  • B. Wrong. Section 3-311 addresses instrument-based satisfaction of an unliquidated or bona fide disputed claim.
  • C. Wrong. Obtaining payment of the instrument is an express condition.
  • D. Correct. The stem supplies good-faith full tender, dispute, conspicuous notice and payment, while excluding the statutory preservation exceptions.
Question 24 · Promissory estoppel

A board promises a longtime employee a pension whenever she chooses to retire, seeking neither further work nor retirement in exchange. She retires earlier than planned because of the promise, which the employer later repudiates. Assuming foreseeable reasonable reliance and injustice, her strongest stated theory is:

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: B.

Authority: Feinberg: pension-induced retirement

  • A. Wrong. The stem expressly excludes a requested exchange for retirement.
  • B. Correct. The changed position induced by the promise supports the estoppel theory illustrated by Feinberg. The absence of a bargain does not end that inquiry.
  • C. Wrong. The stem does not establish unjust retention of a salary benefit or an automatic restitution measure.
  • D. Wrong. A formality defense is not the stated reliance-based ground for recovery.

Review Promissory estoppel

Question 25 · Restitution and unjust enrichment

A bystander summons physicians to an unconscious accident victim. They perform necessary emergency surgery with due skill and care, but the patient dies without regaining consciousness.

Under Cotnam v. Wisdom, which analysis best describes their claim for reasonable compensation?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: A.

Authority: Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83 Ark. 601 (1907), opinion Parts 1–3

  • A. Correct. Cotnam distinguished quasi-contract from an actual agreement and did not make compensation for properly rendered services depend on survival.
  • B. Wrong. The patient made no actual promise. The legal obligation is not a fictional factual finding that unconsciousness expressed consent.
  • C. Wrong. The opinion rejected a requirement to prove benefit from the outcome in addition to the services' value. The stem specifies due skill and care.
  • D. Wrong. The majority rejected estate wealth as the measure in this emergency quasi-contract setting. The inquiry concerns reasonable compensation for the services.
Question 26 · Moral obligation

A stranger voluntarily cares for an independent adult during an illness. The adult's parent neither requested the care nor owed a legal duty to pay for it.

After all services are complete, the grateful parent promises reimbursement, then refuses. Applying the reasoning of Mills v. Wyman, is gratitude alone sufficient consideration for that promise?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: B.

Authority: Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. 207 (1825), Parker opinion

  • A. Wrong. Mills rejected enforcement even though the father's promise was written. Writing did not supply the missing consideration.
  • B. Correct. The services were not requested by the parent and did not discharge a legal obligation established on the facts. Mills refused to convert gratitude alone into enforceable consideration.
  • C. Wrong. The court distinguished an independent adult child from obligations that might arise for a minor or under a particular support statute. The stem excludes such an obligation.
  • D. Wrong. Mills itself discussed preexisting obligations as a different category. Its rejection of this promise is narrower than a rule invalidating every later promise.
Question 27 · Statute of Frauds

A caterer makes an oral agreement expressly requiring two full years of service from formation. Assume no qualifying writing, alternative performance within a year, or applicable exception. Under the one-year category in 12 V.S.A. 181(4), which statement is best?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: B.

Authority: 12 V.S.A. 181(4): one-year category

  • A. Wrong. The category is not confined to goods; the stated service obligation can fall within it.
  • B. Correct. The express two-year performance and stated assumptions trigger this statutory category. The question does not establish any separate restitution entitlement.
  • C. Wrong. The provision specifies the one-year category, not a one-month rule.
  • D. Wrong. Partial service is not completion of the stated two-year obligation. Any independent exception requires its own basis.

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Question 28 · Statute of Frauds

After a disputed phone agreement for goods, a merchant promptly sends a signed confirmation sufficient against itself and stating quantity. The other merchant receives it, has reason to know its contents, and sends no written objection within ten days. What does UCC 2-201(2) establish?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: D.

Authority: UCC 2-201(2): merchant confirmation conditions

  • A. Wrong. The writing defense and incorporation of proposed terms are distinct questions.
  • B. Wrong. Removing a formality defense does not establish that the underlying bargain was made.
  • C. Wrong. Subsection (2) supplies this merchant-confirmation route without both signatures.
  • D. Correct. The stem supplies timing, sender sufficiency, receipt, knowledge and lack of timely written objection. Those conditions address the writing requirement, not every other issue.

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Question 29 · Electronic contracting

Two businesses intentionally sign a supply agreement electronically in interstate commerce. Assume the agreement is within E-SIGN's coverage and satisfies all other formation requirements.

One business argues that it is unenforceable solely because neither signature was put on paper. What does 15 U.S.C. § 7001 provide?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: C.

Authority: 15 U.S.C. § 7001

  • A. Wrong. Section 7001 preserves substantive requirements other than the specified writing and signature formalities. Electronic format does not supply missing assent.
  • B. Wrong. The provision is not restricted to banking transactions. This covered interstate supply agreement falls within the assumed scope.
  • C. Correct. Section 7001(a) prevents denial solely because an electronic signature or record was used. The stem separately establishes the remaining formation requirements.
  • D. Wrong. Section 7001(b)(2) generally does not require a person to agree to use or accept electronic records or signatures. Validity and compulsory adoption are different questions.
Question 30 · Capacity to contract

Apply California Family Code 6710 as reproduced in the cited 2025 text. A person still under majority seeks to disaffirm a contract made during minority.

Assume no statutory exception. Which statement follows from this section alone?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: B.

Authority: California Family Code 6710, 2025 text; California Family Code 6712, 2025 text: a specified exception

  • A. Wrong. The section states a timing rule subject to statutory exceptions; it does not contain the asserted item-use exception.
  • B. Correct. Section 6710 permits disaffirmance before majority or within a reasonable time afterward, subject to its exceptions. It does not itself calculate every restoration obligation.
  • C. Wrong. The stated right concerns a contract of a minor; the option reverses the relevant category.
  • D. Wrong. Those consequences need further authority and facts. The section alone supplies no universal dollar-offset formula.
Question 31 · Duress

A contractor threatens in bad faith to abandon an existing building obligation unless the owner accepts a higher price. Assume the threat is improper under the governing sections 175-176 approach, induces the owner's assent, and leaves no reasonable alternative. Which defense follows?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: D.

Authority: Richards, paragraphs 30-42: improper threats and reasonable alternatives; Alaska Packers: existing duty and coerced additional pay

  • A. Wrong. The issue is coercion affecting assent, not merely prior oral evidence inconsistent with an integrated writing.
  • B. Wrong. Preference for higher compensation does not establish inability to perform.
  • C. Wrong. Voluntary fair modifications can be valid; the stated improper threat and absence of alternatives are decisive here.
  • D. Correct. The hypothetical supplies impropriety, inducement and lack of reasonable alternatives. Richards discusses those requirements and why stress alone would not suffice.
Question 32 · Undue influence

An exhausted person alleges that several negotiators demanded an immediate signature late at night, emphasized disastrous consequences of waiting, and refused time for independent advice. Applying Odorizzi's analysis, which response best addresses an undue-influence claim?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: B.

Authority: Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School District, 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 130–133 (1966)

  • A. Wrong. Odorizzi explains that unfair advantage of weakness or distress need not arise within a confidential relationship.
  • B. Correct. The combination of susceptibility and overpersuasion matters. The court's pleading analysis identifies a possible claim, not automatic proof that influence occurred.
  • C. Wrong. Ordinary persuasion and later regret are not enough. The pressure must cross the line identified by the governing doctrine.
  • D. Wrong. A person's will can be overborne without a misrepresentation. Undue influence and fraud ask different questions.
Question 33 · Misrepresentation

Under the innocent-material-misrepresentation analysis in Barrer, a buyer receives a materially false statement, justifiably relies on it in agreeing and suffers the additional detriment required by District of Columbia law. The speaker lacked fraudulent intent. Does that absence of intent necessarily defeat rescission?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: A.

Authority: Barrer, part B: innocent material misrepresentation and local detriment requirement

  • A. Correct. Barrer distinguishes this equitable ground from intentional fraud and identifies the additional local detriment requirement.
  • B. Wrong. The opinion expressly recognizes innocent material misrepresentation as a possible ground.
  • C. Wrong. Materiality and actual, justified reliance remain separate elements; the stem supplies both.
  • D. Wrong. Required elements and the remedy matter. Avoidance is not automatic nullity from any discrepancy.
Question 34 · Nondisclosure

Under the residential-sale disclosure rule adopted in Hill v. Jones, a seller knows of concealed termite damage that materially affects a house's value. The buyer does not know, and the damage is not readily observable.

Does the buyer's failure to ask a specific termite question necessarily eliminate a disclosure duty?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: D.

Authority: Hill v. Jones, 151 Ariz. 81, 84–86 (Ct. App. 1986), Part III

  • A. Wrong. Hill recognizes an affirmative disclosure duty in the defined residential-sale setting.
  • B. Wrong. The rule is not limited to answering a precisely worded inquiry. The stem supplies the facts triggering the duty.
  • C. Wrong. Materiality and the buyer's knowledge or ability to observe remain important limits. This is not an unlimited obligation to disclose all information.
  • D. Correct. The seller cannot avoid that duty merely because the buyer did not ask about termites. Hill left disputed knowledge and materiality issues to the factfinder; the hypothetical stipulates them.
Question 35 · Unconscionability

A goods seller supplies a contract only after delivery, calls it a routine confirmation and prevents meaningful review. A hidden term gives its insurer exclusive control of arbitration rules and selection of arbitrators. Under a test requiring both procedural and substantive unconscionability, which analysis is strongest?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: C.

Authority: UCC 2-302: timing, remedies and opportunity for evidence; Williams: common-law authority and remand for fact-finding; Burch: adhesion, meaningful opportunity and insurer control; 9 U.S.C. 2: general contract defenses and arbitration

  • A. Wrong. Burch expressly declined to condemn every warranty containing arbitration. The particular allocation of control matters.
  • B. Wrong. Nonreading alone does not establish unconscionability, and the remedy need not invalidate every term. UCC 2-302 also permits severance or limitation.
  • C. Correct. The facts distinguish impaired choice from an oppressive term, as Burch did. They support examining both components rather than treating an unread form as conclusive.
  • D. Wrong. UCC 2-302(2) requires a reasonable opportunity to present commercial-setting, purpose and effect evidence. The determination concerns the time of contracting.

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Question 36 · Illegality

Assume California Civil Code § 1667 applies as reproduced in the cited 2025 Code. Two parties agree to an act that directly violates an express statute. One argues that the object becomes lawful because both signed and no contract term uses the word 'illegal.' Which answer addresses lawfulness under § 1667(1)?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: B.

Authority: California Civil Code § 1667(1), 2025 text

  • A. Wrong. Private agreement cannot turn conduct contrary to an express legal provision into a lawful object under this section.
  • B. Correct. Subsection (1) makes conflict with an express provision of law a basis for unlawfulness. The parties' signatures do not remove that conflict.
  • C. Wrong. The legal character of the object does not depend on a label chosen by the parties.
  • D. Wrong. Classification of the object does not answer every question about remedies, exceptions or severable terms. Those require additional authority and facts.
Question 37 · Public policy

A Massachusetts patient proves a surgeon made a specific promise of a result and breached it. The jury rejects negligence.

The surgeon argues that public policy categorically bars every action on a physician's promise. Which answer follows Sullivan v. O'Connor?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: C.

Authority: Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579 (1973), public-policy and clear-proof discussion

  • A. Wrong. Sullivan discussed policy concerns but did not adopt a rule invalidating all such agreements. Massachusetts recognized a contract claim when the promise was sufficiently established.
  • B. Wrong. Nonnegligent conduct does not necessarily perform a specific contractual promise. The jury's separate findings illustrate the distinction.
  • C. Correct. The court recognized competing concerns and required clear proof of the promise. The decision neither immunized every promise nor converted ordinary reassurance into a guarantee.
  • D. Wrong. The opinion distinguished an actual promise of a result from an optimistic opinion. The nature and proof of the statement matter.
Question 38 · Mutual mistake

A buyer and seller both believe an apartment building can lawfully house tenants. A preexisting sanitation defect defeats that use, but the contract expressly allocates unknown physical-defect risk to the buyer. Under the Lenawee analysis, which answer is strongest?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: A.

Authority: Sherwood: disputed shared premise and new-trial instruction; Lenawee: basic assumption, risk allocation and as-is clause

  • A. Correct. The material mistake and risk allocation are separate questions. The buyer’s agreed assumption of unknown physical-defect risk supplies the obstacle to mistake relief here.
  • B. Wrong. The stem expressly assigns this risk to the buyer. Read the allocation rather than inferring the opposite merely from who drafted the document.
  • C. Wrong. Establishing a shared basic-assumption error does not finish the inquiry. Lenawee denied rescission after finding a material mistake because the buyers bore the relevant risk.
  • D. Wrong. The defect existed at formation. Later discovery does not transform it into a new event that arose afterward.

Review Mutual mistake

Question 39 · Unilateral mistake

A subcontractor supplies a definite bid expecting a general contractor to use it in the main bid. The contractor reasonably does so and has no reason to recognize a computation error. After award the subcontractor tries to withdraw, and the contractor promptly seeks the subcontract as bid without shopping for a lower price.

Which analysis best follows Drennan?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: C.

Authority: Drennan: reliance, mistake and postaward limits; James Baird: contrasting reliance treatment

  • A. Wrong. The alleged error concerns the bid itself, not a later event destroying the transaction's purpose.
  • B. Wrong. The contractor did not share the subcontractor's computation error.
  • C. Correct. Drennan protects the specified reliance and prompt acceptance opportunity. Its limits include reason to recognize error and postaward bid shopping.
  • D. Wrong. The opinion's protection depends on its reliance analysis; it is not a rule making every bid a permanent option.
Question 40 · Misunderstanding

A contract names the vessel Peerless without a sailing date. The buyer pleads that it meant the October vessel, while the seller offered cotton carried by a different Peerless sailing in December.

The seller challenges whether that pleading can be a defense. Which outcome matches the reported decision in Raffles v. Wichelhaus?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: D.

Authority: Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 H. & C. 906 (1864), plea and per curiam disposition

  • A. Wrong. The judges' interventions questioned treating cotton identified by one ship as interchangeable with cotton on another. The seller's demurrer did not prevail.
  • B. Wrong. That broad proposition is not the reported holding. The dispute concerned an ambiguous identifier applying to two ships, not merely an undisclosed private wish.
  • C. Wrong. The reported disposition is judgment for the defendants on the seller's claim. It is not a buyer's consequential-damages award.
  • D. Correct. The court sustained the pleaded defense. Distinguish that procedural result from factual findings after trial or a detailed modern test that the short report does not articulate.
Question 41 · Contract interpretation

A goods contract has no express term resolving delivery hour. Applicable course-of-performance evidence conflicts with prior course of dealing, and reasonable consistency is impossible.

No waiver or modification issue is presented. Under UCC 1-303(e), which source prevails between those two?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: A.

Authority: UCC 1-303

  • A. Correct. The stem supplies an actual inconsistency and excludes an express term or separate waiver question, making the specified priority applicable.
  • B. Wrong. Trade usage is lower in this hierarchy, and the problem concerns two identified sources.
  • C. Wrong. The statute provides a priority rule for this conflict.
  • D. Wrong. Subsection (e) places course of performance above course of dealing when reasonable consistency is impossible.
Question 42 · Ambiguity

A judge following Pacific Gas & Electric v. G.W. Thomas Drayage thinks a clause is clear on its face. A party offers credible surrounding-circumstances evidence to show a different meaning to which the words are reasonably susceptible.

May the judge reject that evidence solely because the judge's first reading seems clear?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: C.

Authority: Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33 (1968), interpretation discussion

  • A. Wrong. PG&E rejects treating apparent facial clarity as sufficient grounds to exclude otherwise relevant interpretive evidence.
  • B. Wrong. The decision allows evidence to determine meaning while preserving the distinction between interpretation and impermissibly varying the agreement.
  • C. Correct. Preliminary consideration helps determine whether the language can reasonably bear the offered meaning. Facial clarity to the judge does not end that inquiry under this approach.
  • D. Wrong. Reasonable susceptibility remains a limit. Considering evidence does not require adopting any meaning a party proposes.
Question 43 · Parol evidence rule

A court finds a truck-sale writing intended as a complete and exclusive agreement. The buyer offers an earlier oral promise of extra tires only as a consistent additional term, with no separate interpretation, validity or usage claim. Under UCC 2-202(b), is that evidence admitted?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: B.

Authority: UCC 2-202: final expression and additional terms

  • A. Wrong. Consistent additional terms are excluded when the required completeness finding is made.
  • B. Correct. The stated finding triggers the limit on consistent additional terms; it is not inferred solely from a merger clause.
  • C. Wrong. The rule protects the adopted writing on its integrated subjects.
  • D. Wrong. Relevance is not the problem. The issue is adding this term to the complete agreement.

Review Parol evidence rule

Question 44 · Parol evidence rule

A deed reserves an option and is silent about assignment. Grantees offer an alleged collateral agreement that the option was personal. Under the Masterson majority's reasoning, which conclusion is best?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: D.

Authority: Masterson: scope of integration and collateral agreement

  • A. Wrong. The majority considered context rather than treating silence as a conclusive integration.
  • B. Wrong. Admissibility and factual proof remain separate.
  • C. Wrong. The majority distinguished a default supplied by law from an express written term.
  • D. Correct. Those questions supported admitting the evidence in Masterson. The dissent took a different view of consistency, and the restriction still needed proof.

Review Parol evidence rule

Question 45 · Integration clauses

A court finds a written goods contract to be a complete and exclusive statement of the parties' agreement. The buyer offers evidence of an earlier oral promise to include free installation as an additional term, not as an interpretation based on trade usage or the parties' conduct. Under UCC § 2-202(b), may the buyer add the promise merely because it does not contradict the writing?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: B.

Authority: UCC § 2-202

  • A. Wrong. The permission to prove consistent additional terms has an express exception for a complete and exclusive written statement.
  • B. Correct. Consistency alone is insufficient after this finding of complete integration. The question concerns adding an earlier oral promise, not explaining the writing through a category covered by subsection (a).
  • C. Wrong. That goes beyond the rule. Section 2-202 separately addresses course of dealing, usage of trade and course of performance.
  • D. Wrong. Party identity does not establish priority. The final writing and the court's integration finding control this question.
Question 46 · Course of performance

One contract calls for twelve monthly deliveries of flour but leaves delivery-hour terminology unclear. For six months the seller arrives at 5 p.m. The buyer knows the timing, has an opportunity to object, and accepts without objection.

Under UCC § 1-303, how should those six deliveries be classified?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: B.

Authority: UCC § 1-303

  • A. Wrong. Course of dealing concerns previous transactions between the parties. These deliveries are repeated occasions under the same transaction.
  • B. Correct. Section 1-303(a) looks to repeated performance under the agreement, known and accepted or acquiesced in without objection. The facts supply each part.
  • C. Wrong. Conduct between these parties under one contract does not by itself establish a practice observed with sufficient regularity in the trade.
  • D. Wrong. Section 1-303 permits course of performance to help determine the agreement's meaning. The timing evidence is relevant, though its ultimate effect depends on the terms and other evidence.
Question 47 · Course of dealing

During four earlier purchases, a wholesaler and shop consistently used 'case' to mean 24 bottles. A new order uses 'case' without defining it, and no delivery has yet occurred under that order. Which UCC § 1-303 category most directly covers the earlier purchases?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: C.

Authority: UCC § 1-303

  • A. Wrong. The four purchases were previous transactions. The new order has not yet produced repeated performance.
  • B. Wrong. A private pattern does not conclusively prove the regularity of a practice throughout a relevant trade or place.
  • C. Correct. Section 1-303(b) addresses prior transactions between these parties that establish a shared basis for interpreting their expressions. Those transactions can help explain 'case.'
  • D. Wrong. The evidence predates the new order and concerns its meaning. No later agreement changing that order is described.
Question 48 · Trade usage

A supplier offers evidence of a packaging practice regularly observed in the buyer's trade. The buyer should be aware of the practice, and it can reasonably be read consistently with the written contract. The supplier gives litigation notice sufficient to prevent unfair surprise.

Under UCC § 1-303, does the absence of a prior transaction between these parties alone bar the evidence?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: D.

Authority: UCC § 1-303

  • A. Wrong. That confuses usage of trade with course of dealing. No three-contract requirement appears in § 1-303.
  • B. Wrong. Section 1-303(d) allows relevant trade usage to explain or supplement an agreement. The stem also removes a conflict with express terms.
  • C. Wrong. Existence and scope must be proved as facts. A bare assertion of industry custom is not enough.
  • D. Correct. A sufficiently regular practice in the relevant trade can be relevant independently of the parties' own past dealings. Awareness and fair-notice safeguards still matter.
Question 49 · Good faith and fair dealing

A sales agreement governed by the UCC contains no paragraph labeled 'good faith.' During a dispute about performance, the seller argues that no good-faith obligation applies because the parties did not write one. Which answer best addresses that argument?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: A.

Authority: UCC § 1-304

  • A. Correct. The obligation attaches to contracts and duties within the UCC. A missing heading or clause does not remove it.
  • B. Wrong. Section 1-304 does not require separate consideration for the obligation.
  • C. Wrong. Silence in the agreement does not erase the statutory obligation of good faith.
  • D. Wrong. The section supplies an obligation, not an automatic liability finding. The conduct and governing standards still need analysis.
Question 50 · Express conditions

A letter states that no sublease will exist unless written landlord consent is delivered by June 1. Only oral notice arrives by that date; no waiver, estoppel or forfeiture ground is established. Under Oppenheimer, which statement is correct?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: C.

Authority: Oppenheimer: express conditions, substantial performance and excuse; Mattei: conditional performance and good-faith satisfaction; Jacob & Youngs: constructive conditions and reserved express-condition issue

  • A. Wrong. The condition specifies the form and delivery, not merely knowledge of consent. Oppenheimer rejected oral notice as substantial compliance on its record.
  • B. Wrong. A condition and a promise have different functions. This clause concerns formation of the sublease, not simply damages for a broken promise.
  • C. Correct. An unmistakable express condition ordinarily requires literal occurrence. A supported independent excuse could matter, but the stem excludes those grounds.
  • D. Wrong. Waiver requires supporting conduct or agreement. The mere fact that a deadline was missed establishes no waiver.

Review Express conditions

Question 51 · Constructive conditions

Under the majority's approach in Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, a builder's unintentional deviation is trivial in relation to a completed project. Replacement would require extensive demolition.

Assume the court finds substantial performance and the parties did not expressly make literal compliance with this term a condition of payment. What is the best analysis?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: D.

Authority: Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239 (1921), Cardozo majority opinion

  • A. Wrong. The majority declined to imply a forfeiture-producing condition for the trivial, unintentional default described.
  • B. Wrong. Substantial performance does not equal perfect performance. A damages allowance can remain even though payment is due.
  • C. Wrong. The opinion denied a general license to substitute at will. The unintentional and trivial character of the deviation matters.
  • D. Correct. Separate the duty to pay from compensation for the remaining defect. The majority's treatment of implied conditions avoids forfeiture without declaring the specification meaningless.
Question 52 · Waiver of conditions

A buyer waives a goods contract's remaining delivery deadline. The seller materially changes position in reliance on that waiver. The buyer later sends a demand for strict compliance.

Assume retracting the waiver would be unjust because of that reliance. Under UCC § 2-209(5), is notification alone enough to restore the original deadline?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: C.

Authority: UCC § 2-209

  • A. Wrong. Section 2-209(5) expressly limits retraction where material reliance would make it unjust.
  • B. Wrong. The problem gives an effective waiver. It does not ask whether a new bargain supported by consideration was formed.
  • C. Correct. Reasonable notification is ordinarily part of retraction, but it does not defeat the statute's reliance exception. The stem supplies that exception.
  • D. Wrong. The provision ordinarily allows retraction of a waiver affecting executory performance through reasonable notification. Reliance supplies the limit here.
Question 53 · Substantial performance

A builder is owed a final $20,000. Applying Jacob & Youngs, the court finds substantial performance, an innocent trivial brand deviation and no express condition requiring literal compliance. It also finds that $15,000 replacement work would be grossly disproportionate to the benefit and that the defect reduces value by $500.

With no other loss or offset, what remains payable?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: C.

Authority: Jacob & Youngs: substantial performance, forfeiture and value allowance

  • A. Wrong. The problem gives findings supporting the value measure rather than an automatic replacement deduction.
  • B. Wrong. The assumed substantial performance satisfies the constructive condition while preserving damages.
  • C. Correct. The final balance of $20,000 less the proved $500 allowance is $19,500. The hypothetical supplies the findings needed for that measure.
  • D. Wrong. Substantial performance is not perfect performance. The remaining defect still receives compensation.
Question 54 · Material breach

A noninstallment goods tender fails to conform. Assume no contrary agreed remedy limits and no acceptance yet. Under 2-601, subject to the seller's applicable cure rights, which is best?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: A.

Authority: UCC 2-601: nonconforming tender; UCC 2-508: cure qualifications

  • A. Correct. Those are the statutory options, with commercial-unit, cure and other applicable qualifications.
  • B. Wrong. Section 2-601 is not limited to a tender mostly failing to conform.
  • C. Wrong. The provision does not grant free ownership or remove the required remedies accounting.
  • D. Wrong. Apply the goods rule and its qualifications rather than substituting the general materiality test.

Review Material breach

Question 55 · Material breach

Assume an uncured breach is material under Restatement 241, but the circumstances leave a timely cure opportunity under 242. Which legal conclusion follows under the Restatement approach discussed in Frazier?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: C.

Authority: Frazier: Restatement 241/242 and distinction between suspension and discharge

  • A. Wrong. Cure can affect discharge while leaving liability for delay or other proved breach loss.
  • B. Wrong. The stem expressly leaves a timely cure opportunity, requiring the separate inquiry.
  • C. Correct. Materiality alone does not resolve when discharge occurs under the stated approach; timely cure and the relevant delay circumstances matter.
  • D. Wrong. Governing law depends on the transaction, not the vocabulary of the allegation.

Review Material breach

Question 56 · Divisible contracts

A court applying the divisible-contract doctrine discussed in Filet Menu finds that a contract pairs each completed design project with its own agreed fee. A designer completes one pair and then materially breaches an unperformed pair. Which statement best captures the consequence of divisibility?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: A.

Authority: Filet Menu, Inc. v. C.C.L. & G., Inc., 79 Cal. App. 4th 852, 860–861 (2000)

  • A. Correct. Treating corresponding performances as agreed equivalents can preserve compensation for the completed part. The doctrine does not immunize the breaching party from consequences of the remaining failure.
  • B. Wrong. Preventing that automatic forfeiture is the point of the mitigating doctrine when the parts qualify as agreed equivalents.
  • C. Wrong. Filet Menu explains that a divisible contract remains one contract. The analogy to separate exchanges has limits.
  • D. Wrong. Completion of one matched part does not establish performance of another. The unperformed pair supplies no earned fee on these facts.
Question 57 · Anticipatory repudiation

Before its next delivery is due, a repudiating goods seller clearly communicates that it intends to perform, including every justifiably demanded assurance. The buyer has not canceled, materially changed position or indicated final treatment. Under 2-611, which is best?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: D.

Authority: UCC 2-610: substantial impairment and remedial choices; UCC 2-611: deadline, bars and effect of retraction

  • A. Wrong. The stated conditions leave the statutory retraction route open.
  • B. Wrong. Subsection (3) preserves appropriate excuse and allowance for the repudiation's delay.
  • C. Wrong. Subsection (1) sets an outside limit at the next performance due.
  • D. Correct. The timely complete communication and absence of earlier bars satisfy the stated retraction conditions.

Review Anticipatory repudiation

Question 58 · Adequate assurances

A goods seller has reasonable grounds for insecurity about a buyer's next payment. The seller has not received the agreed return for the delivery it proposes to suspend. Under UCC 2-609, which response is supported while adequate assurance is sought?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: B.

Authority: UCC 2-609

  • A. Wrong. Insecurity permits the assurance process; it is not itself automatic repudiation.
  • B. Correct. Written demand, grounds, scope and commercial reasonableness matter. Failure to provide adequate assurance within a reasonable time after receipt, at most thirty days, can then be repudiation.
  • C. Wrong. Section 2-609 limits the performance that may be suspended; it does not authorize an unrestricted halt.
  • D. Wrong. Thirty days is a ceiling on a reasonable response period, not a guaranteed minimum.
Question 59 · Impossibility

A promoter contracts for the use of one identified theater on four dates. An accidental fire destroys it before the first date, without either party's fault. Neither party promised a substitute or assumed the destruction risk.

Applying Taylor v. Caldwell's implied-condition analysis, what is the best result?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: C.

Authority: Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826 (1863), Blackburn judgment

  • A. Wrong. Taylor recognized an implied condition where performance depended on a specific thing continuing to exist. The court distinguished such a bargain from an unconditional undertaking.
  • B. Wrong. Freedom from negligence does not establish a right to payment for the excused exchange. The destruction excused both parties' dependent performances in Taylor.
  • C. Correct. The stem supplies the identified subject, accidental destruction, absence of fault, and absence of a contrary risk allocation. Those are the facts driving the implied-condition analysis.
  • D. Wrong. An express substitute obligation would change the bargain. The implied condition cannot simply erase a promise to perform despite the original theater's loss.
Question 60 · Impracticability

A farmer agrees to sell 1,000 bushels of corn at $5 per bushel. A regional drought raises the market price to $8, but the farmer’s contracted crop remains intact and delivery requires no added effort or expense. He refuses because selling elsewhere would be more profitable; which answer best applies UCC 2-615?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: B.

Authority: UCC 2-615: excuse, allocation and notice

  • A. Wrong. Naming a serious regional event does not establish its effect on this seller’s promised performance.
  • B. Correct. The stated facts show only an opportunity to earn more elsewhere, while the contracted crop and delivery remain available without added burden.
  • C. Wrong. Section 2-615 does not make the buyer accept a higher price simply because the seller prefers another sale.
  • D. Wrong. Notice is a requirement for a qualifying excuse, not a substitute for demonstrating one.

Review Impracticability

Question 61 · Frustration of purpose

Parties reserve a particular balcony solely to view a named procession on specified dates, discussing its distinctive view. The procession is later canceled, although access remains possible. Under Krell's reasoning, which is the best analysis?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: D.

Authority: Krell: purpose, risk and deposit limits

  • A. Wrong. Frustration can concern the foundation's disappearance while physical performance remains possible.
  • B. Wrong. Krell distinguishes a contractual foundation from an ordinary customer's motive.
  • C. Wrong. Krell did not adjudicate the abandoned deposit counterclaim.
  • D. Correct. The distinctive location, dates and communicated purpose support the foundation argument, but the risk question still matters.

Review Frustration of purpose

Question 62 · Expectation damages

A buyer agrees to pay $80,000 for a machine. After the seller fails to deliver, the buyer makes a reasonable, prompt and good-faith substitute purchase for $95,000, plus $1,000 of additional commercially reasonable shipping expense. Assuming no saved expenses, other losses or contractual remedy limits, the buyer’s recovery under UCC 2-712 is:

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: A.

Authority: UCC 2-712: cover; UCC 2-715: incidental and consequential losses

  • A. Correct. The $15,000 cover differential plus the qualifying $1,000 incidental expense gives $16,000.
  • B. Wrong. This captures the cover differential but omits the stated additional shipping expense under section 2-715.
  • C. Wrong. The full substitute price and shipping would ignore the $80,000 the buyer expected to pay under the original bargain.
  • D. Wrong. Shipping is not the only loss: the replacement also costs $15,000 more than the original contract.
Question 63 · Reliance damages

Under the damages analysis discussed in Sullivan v. O'Connor, which proposed measure best describes the reliance interest, as distinct from restitution and expectation? Assume the identified losses are compensable in the particular case and no duplication is allowed.

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: A.

Authority: Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579 (1973), discussion of the three damages measures

  • A. Correct. The court described reliance as restoring the position before the agreement. That can encompass more than the defendant's fee without necessarily awarding the full promised improvement.
  • B. Wrong. Limiting recovery to benefits conferred on the defendant describes restitution, not the entire reliance interest discussed by the court.
  • C. Wrong. The full promised-result comparison describes expectation. Reliance uses a different baseline.
  • D. Wrong. The opinion does not make a breach sufficient proof of every asserted loss. Causation, the agreement's subject matter and proof still constrain recovery.
Question 64 · Restitution damages

A buyer pays a $2,000 deposit on goods priced at $10,000, then breaches. The seller justifiably withholds delivery.

Assume UCC § 2-718 applies, there is no liquidated-damages term, and the seller establishes no damages or benefits to offset under subsection (3). How much of the deposit is the buyer entitled to recover under subsection (2)?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: A.

Authority: UCC § 2-718

  • A. Correct. Twenty percent of the $10,000 performance is $2,000. The smaller of that amount and $500 is $500, so the $2,000 payment exceeds the permitted retention by $1,500. The stem excludes further offsets.
  • B. Wrong. Section 2-718(2) expressly gives a breaching buyer a restitution right in the described situation.
  • C. Wrong. Without a valid liquidated-damages term, subsection (2)(b) supplies the stated statutory amount. It is not automatically zero.
  • D. Wrong. The $500 figure helps calculate what the payment must exceed. It is not a cap on the refund.
Question 65 · Foreseeability of damages

At contracting, a carrier is told that a mill is stopped and a broken shaft is urgently needed. Delay follows and the miller claims all shutdown profit. Under Hadley's reported facts and reasoning, which statement is best?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: C.

Authority: Hadley: stated notice and excluded profits

  • A. Wrong. The report expressly records notice of stoppage and urgency.
  • B. Wrong. The court nevertheless found the relevant special circumstances insufficient for these profits.
  • C. Correct. The inquiry links the information at formation to the loss claimed instead of equating urgency with an automatic award.
  • D. Wrong. Hadley imposes limits rather than compensation for every consequence.
Question 66 · Certainty of damages

An entertainer proves breach of a surgeon's promise and a worsened appearance but provides no evidence that the change caused lost employment or earnings. Using Sullivan v. O'Connor's treatment of the lost-earnings item, what should the jury do with a request for lost earnings?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: B.

Authority: Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579 (1973), evidence and damages instructions

  • A. Wrong. In Sullivan, the professional-entertainer status did not establish employment loss. The trial instruction excluded earnings because no resulting loss had been proved.
  • B. Correct. The unsupported category stays out. Other proved items, such as the consequences of the worsened condition, do not disappear merely because earnings were unproved.
  • C. Wrong. The opinion upheld recovery of other items despite the lack of an earnings showing. Evaluate each claimed loss on its own evidentiary basis.
  • D. Wrong. Failure of proof does not create a punitive award. Sullivan's analysis concerned compensation, not an automatic punishment substitute.
Question 67 · Mitigation

After canceling a California musical role with director and screenplay approval rights, a studio offers the performer equal pay for a dramatic role abroad with fewer approval rights. Under Parker's majority analysis, which is best?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: C.

Authority: Parker: substitute role and reserved issues

  • A. Wrong. The majority compared the kind of role, location and approval rights in addition to compensation.
  • B. Wrong. The offered work must be evaluated; a different or inferior substitute does not establish this offset.
  • C. Correct. Parker rejected the studio's specific substitute on its record rather than treating equal salary as conclusive.
  • D. Wrong. The case did not decide a separate failure-to-search issue or that mitigation never applies.
Question 68 · Liquidated damages

A goods-sale agreement fixes a very large payment for any breach, from a trivial delay to total nondelivery. Under model UCC 2-718(1), what is the best analysis?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: A.

Authority: UCC 2-718: reasonable liquidation, deposits and offsets

  • A. Correct. The same sum for very different breaches invites scrutiny, but the statutory factors determine the result.
  • B. Wrong. A label does not establish statutory reasonableness.
  • C. Wrong. The text expressly includes anticipated or actual harm.
  • D. Wrong. The section permits reasonable liquidation rather than banning it.

Review Liquidated damages

Question 69 · Penalty clauses

A goods contract requires the buyer to pay $90,000 for any delay, including one day. For the one-day delay at issue, anticipated and actual harm are each about $200; proof and an adequate ordinary remedy present no difficulty. The court finds the stipulated amount unreasonably large under UCC § 2-718(1). What follows?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: D.

Authority: UCC § 2-718

  • A. Wrong. Agreement does not overcome § 2-718's express restriction on an unreasonably large stipulated amount.
  • B. Wrong. Invalidating the penalty does not by itself unwind the entire sale or establish a right to a full refund.
  • C. Wrong. Reasonable liquidated damages are permitted. The problem identifies why this amount fails.
  • D. Correct. The statute makes an unreasonably large amount void as a penalty. That does not establish the amount of any ordinary damages the seller can prove.
Question 70 · Specific performance

A goods buyer seeks specific performance during a shortage. The goods are commercially manufactured rather than one of a kind. What does UCC 2-716(1) require the court to consider?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: D.

Authority: UCC 2-716: unique goods, proper circumstances and replevin

  • A. Wrong. The text includes another route beyond unique goods.
  • B. Wrong. Breach alone does not establish the requested statutory relief.
  • C. Wrong. A decree may include price and other just conditions under subsection (2).
  • D. Correct. The buyer must support the remedial circumstances; manufactured origin does not alone foreclose the request.
Question 71 · Third-party beneficiaries

A debtor advances value to another in return for a promise to pay the debtor's identified creditor. The creditor did not personally supply that value. Under the Lawrence majority, which is best?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: B.

Authority: Lawrence v. Fox: official judicial opinions

  • A. Wrong. Lawrence sustained the creditor's enforcement on its arrangement.
  • B. Correct. The majority rejected the argument that the creditor's lack of direct consideration or privity defeated this claim.
  • C. Wrong. The decision concerns the promised payment for the creditor, not every indirect commercial advantage.
  • D. Wrong. Value from the debtor can support the payment promise; the beneficiary need not personally advance it.
Question 72 · Assignment of rights

For a covered commercial account, a debtor receives effective authenticated notice identifying the assignment and directing full payment to the assignee. No statutory exception or unmet proof request applies. If the debtor pays the assignor anyway, what follows under 9-406(a)?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: B.

Authority: UCC 9-406(a)-(c): notification and proof; UCC 9-404: defenses and claims

  • A. Wrong. The timing and effective notice change the stated discharge rule.
  • B. Correct. The assumed notification and absence of exceptions make payment to the assignor ineffective to discharge the obligation.
  • C. Wrong. Section 9-404 separately preserves applicable defenses and claims; notice is not a blanket defense waiver.
  • D. Wrong. Section 9-406 specifically governs the stated notification's effect.

Review Assignment of rights

Question 73 · Delegation of duties

Apply UCC 2-210(1). A goods buyer has a substantial interest in the named seller itself performing the agreed precision work, and no term authorizes replacement.

The seller delegates that work to another factory. Which is best?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: D.

Authority: UCC 2-210

  • A. Wrong. Subsection (1) preserves the substantial-interest exception as well as contrary agreement.
  • B. Wrong. Delegation is generally permitted subject to the statutory and contractual limits; this answer is categorical.
  • C. Wrong. Notification alone does not remove the exception specified in the stem.
  • D. Correct. The buyer's substantial interest in original performance supplies the stated limit. A permitted delegation would also not automatically release the original seller.
Question 74 · Novation

Ana validly owes Bo $1,000, and Cy validly owes Ana $1,000. All three make a supported, valid agreement substituting Cy's obligation to Bo for both existing debts, expressly releasing Ana from Bo's claim.

Cy later defaults. Under the novation distinction discussed in Imperial Hotels, can Bo recover the released debt from Ana merely because Cy failed to pay?

Answer and explanations

Correct answer: A.

Authority: Imperial Hotels, part II: replacement, consent and discharge

  • A. Correct. The stem establishes actual substitution and discharge, rather than mere permission for another person to perform. Cy's default does not undo that stipulated release.
  • B. Wrong. Continuing liability after an ordinary delegation differs from an agreed novation.
  • C. Wrong. Imperial Hotels requires evidence of intended discharge and warns that third-party payments alone do not necessarily establish it. The hypothetical gives express agreement.
  • D. Wrong. The problem expressly supplies a supported valid replacement; reciprocal debt releases are part of the stated exchange.

3 timed essays

Set a timer for the minutes shown. Write your answer before you open the rubric.

Essay 1: The jet ski · 30 minutes

On June 1, Mika, who runs a marine dealership, told Devon by phone, 'I will sell you the 2024 Wave Runner for $9,000. You have until Friday, June 5, to decide.' Devon said, 'Sounds good, let me think about it.' Nothing was written.

On June 3, Mika sold the Wave Runner to Priya for $10,000. On June 4, Devon's friend Sam, who had personally seen that sale, told Devon about it.

On June 5, Devon called Mika and accepted the $9,000 offer. Mika refused to sell. Devon sues.

Apply model UCC Article 2 and supplementary common-law formation principles. Identify any facts that would change your answer.

Grading rubric (20 points)
IssuePointsWhat earns them
Applicable law and offer3Identifies goods and a communicated offer, while treating Devon's request to think as something other than acceptance.
Hold-open promise4Separates a paid option from a merchant firm offer. Finds neither consideration for an option nor the signed written assurance required by 2-205; no reliance is stated.
Indirect notice and timing5Uses Dickinson and Normile as analogies. Applies Sam's firsthand knowledge before Devon's acceptance; does not make agency a requirement or an undisclosed sale automatic notice.
Independent enforceability problem5Applies 2-201 to the price and absent writing. Checks confirmation, specially manufactured goods, admission and accepted payment or delivery without inventing any exception as a fact.
Conclusion and changed facts3Separately states lack of timely acceptance and the writing defense. Explains that making an offer irrevocable does not by itself resolve enforceability of the sale.
Model answer

The Wave Runner is a good. Mika identifies the item and price and communicates a proposal Devon could accept. Devon instead asks for time to think; those words do not yet accept the sale.

A stated deadline does not by itself make an offer irrevocable. No separate consideration supports an option, and Devon has done nothing in reliance.

Mika is a merchant, but the firm-offer route in 2-205 requires a signed written assurance. The telephone statement lacks that formality.

Dickinson and Normile illustrate the significance of learning about a completed inconsistent sale before attempting acceptance. Sam personally saw this sale, which supports treating his report as reliable information. He need not be Mika's agent.

Devon received the report on June 4, before his June 5 acceptance. On those facts, acceptance came too late even though the stated decision period had not expired.

The writing issue is independent. Under 2-201 the $9,000 sale needs the prescribed signed evidence or an exception. There is no writing or merchant confirmation, no specially manufactured item, and no accepted payment or receipt of goods.

Mika's refusal does not establish an admission in court. If later testimony admitted an agreement, that could change this defense, but it would not cure the lack of acceptance before revocation.

Mika therefore has a strong formation defense and, even assuming an agreement, a separate statute-of-frauds defense. Reliable notice after acceptance would change the timing analysis. A signed hold-open assurance or a supported option could change revocability, but the sale's own enforceability requirements would still need examination.

Other defensible analysis

Credit a reliability argument grounded in evidence. Sam's friendship is not the defect. He personally observed the inconsistent sale, so an answer demanding authority to speak for Mika would miss the difference between an agent delivering a revocation and a witness supplying reliable information that the offered transaction is no longer available before Devon tries to accept it. Identify what Sam actually knew.

A different sequence changes formation. If Devon accepted before learning of the completed sale, the analysis could no longer rely on the same pre-acceptance notice, but an answer would still need to test the goods-sale writing requirement before concluding that the changed timing alone established an enforceable right to obtain the Wave Runner. Treat the defenses separately.

An undisclosed sale is another variation. Moving only the sale date while leaving Devon unaware would not reproduce the information he received on June 4, which is why an answer should mark both the inconsistent transaction and the time reliable notice reached the offeree instead of treating them as one automatic event. The timeline needs both entries.

A genuine option needs support. If changed facts add separate consideration for a real hold-open undertaking, analyze that undertaking on its own terms and then return to the sale's enforceability; paying for the opportunity to accept does not silently supply every formality or exception needed for the underlying transaction. A deadline alone remains insufficient.

A signed assurance requires its own analysis. Making Mika's hold-open statement a qualifying signed writing could change the firm-offer question under 2-205, while the enforceability of the resulting sale still calls for the prescribed evidence under 2-201 or a supported exception, so the same document must be examined for each distinct legal function it is claimed to perform. Merchant status does not replace the writing.

An admission would address a different problem. If later court testimony supplied the admission contemplated by 2-201, credit the resulting argument about the writing defense without pretending that testimony also moved Devon's earlier acceptance ahead of Sam's report or created an agreement that had never formed on the stated chronology. A defense exception is not formation. Explain each changed fact's actual legal effect.

Essay 2: The bakery oven · 45 minutes

Sunrise Bakery ordered an industrial oven from Titan Equipment on March 1 for $50,000, requesting May 1 delivery. Before Titan responded, Sunrise emailed that it needed the oven by May 1 for a signed $120,000 hotel catering contract. Titan's signed acknowledgment accepted the price and delivery date but added, 'Titan's liability for delay is limited to $500.'

It did not require Sunrise to assent before Titan would proceed. Sunrise never expressly agreed to the cap. Assume both parties are merchants for UCC 2-207.

The oven arrived June 15. Sunrise lost the hotel job, which it says would have produced $30,000 net profit. It rented a substitute oven June 1-15 for $4,000.

The record does not explain the late rental or give evidence of trade practice about liability caps. Apply model UCC Article 2 to the cap and claimed losses, stating what further proof matters.

Grading rubric (20 points)
IssuePointsWhat earns them
Formation and added term5Applies 2-207 in sequence; does not infer a conditional acceptance merely from adding a cap. Identifies material alteration and other exclusions, recognizes missing trade evidence, and avoids automatic assent from silence.
Breach2Finds failure to meet the agreed delivery date, without treating the cap's exclusion as proof of every damage claim.
Substitute oven expense3Tests whether $4,000 was a reasonable breach-related expense under 2-715(1). Does not mechanically apply the purchase-price cover formula to a temporary rental.
Lost net profit5Applies seller knowledge at contracting, causation, proof of net loss, and reasonable avoidance. Distinguishes $120,000 revenue from $30,000 claimed profit and identifies the unexplained rental delay.
If the cap entered the agreement3Separately examines 2-719, including commercial-loss unconscionability and any supported essential-purpose theory. Does not declare a small cap a penalty or automatically invalid.
Conditional accounting2Shows up to $34,000 only if both separate losses are proved without duplication; addresses the alternative effect of an enforceable $500 total delay cap.
Model answer

Titan's acknowledgment accepts the item, price, and requested delivery date. Under 2-207(1), the added cap does not alone turn that response into a rejection. The stated record lacks a clear demand for Sunrise's assent as a condition of proceeding, the distinction emphasized in Dorton.

The cap is an additional term. With merchant status assumed, check the statutory exclusions. There is no stated limitation in Sunrise's offer or timely objection; the disputed issue is material alteration.

A $500 cap against the disclosed risk of losing substantial catering profit supports Sunrise's risk-shifting argument. Whether such a term was expected in the trade remains relevant and unproved.

Silence does not expressly adopt a material addition. Step-Saver supports examining the change in agreed risk, rather than treating the last form as automatically controlling.

Delivery on June 15 breaches the agreed May 1 date. That establishes the delay, but causation and proof still determine the amount recoverable.

The $4,000 temporary rental may be a reasonable expense incident to delay under 2-715(1). Sunrise must show its connection to the breach and reasonableness. Section 2-712 describes a substitute purchase; its price-difference formula should not simply be applied to this rental while Sunrise also keeps the original oven.

For consequential loss, the pre-acceptance email gave Titan reason to know of the hotel work. The relevant claim is the proved $30,000 net profit, not the $120,000 gross contract revenue. Sunrise must connect cancellation to the oven delay and substantiate the expected profit.

Reasonable avoidance is critical: why was an oven not rented until June 1, and could an earlier substitute have saved the hotel job? Those facts may reduce or defeat this claimed loss.

If the cap entered the agreement, incorporation and substantive enforceability remain distinct. Section 2-719 permits agreed remedy limits and scrutinizes consequential-loss restrictions for unconscionability; commercial loss is not prima facie unconscionable.

An essential-purpose argument needs facts explaining how the agreed remedy failed. The cap's small size alone does not establish either theory, nor make a maximum-liability provision an unreasonably large liquidated penalty.

If the cap is excluded and both losses are reasonable, proved and separate, the stated claims total $34,000. That is a conditional ceiling on these claims, not an automatic award. Any overlapping loss or avoidable profit must be removed.

If an enforceable $500 cap governs all delay liability, its scope may instead limit the combined claim to $500.

Other defensible analysis

Either material-alteration conclusion can earn credit. Tie it to the facts. Sunrise disclosed a substantial downstream use before Titan accepted, while evidence about trade expectations remains absent, so the answer must connect surprise or hardship to this proposed allocation of delay risk instead of saying either that every commercial cap is material or that silence automatically adopts every merchant term. Identify the missing trade evidence.

Subsection (3) needs a formation problem. Merely objecting that the cap is unfair does not explain why the communications failed under subsection (1), particularly where the prompt denies any requirement that Sunrise assent before Titan proceeds; a conduct-based formation analysis therefore needs a supported account of that failure before choosing terms by a different statutory route. Formation and incorporation remain distinct.

The rental requires its own proof. If an earlier substitute was unavailable despite reasonable efforts, that added evidence could answer the avoidance objection without establishing either the hotel's cancellation date or the claimed profit, which still need a causal account connecting the delivery breach to the specific loss instead of assuming every disclosed catering contract would fail. Ask when the hotel needed performance.

An available earlier rental changes another premise. Proof that a suitable substitute could reasonably have preserved the hotel job may undermine the profit claim while leaving a reasonable breach-related expense to be evaluated separately, so credit an answer that identifies which dollars the alternative would have prevented and declines to erase the entire damages case merely because one item was avoidable. The temporary hire is not a purchase.

The stated totals are conditional. A calculation of $30,000 plus $4,000 reaches $34,000 only after separate proof and duplication checks, while the $120,000 hotel revenue cannot be substituted for net profit simply because it appears in a signed customer contract and was communicated to Titan before the acknowledgment. Evidence must substantiate the profit figure.

An incorporated cap still needs interpretation. If a valid $500 limit covers all delay liability, explain its possible effect on the combined claims and then test any supported challenge under 2-719, without confusing a maximum remedy with an oversized liquidated payment or asserting that a small ceiling necessarily proves unconscionability or failure of essential purpose. Those challenges require their own facts. Preserve the alternative conclusions.

Essay 3: The kitchen remodel · 45 minutes

Ruth hired Bright Builders to remodel her kitchen for $60,000. The signed contract expressly requires granite counters and a specified cabinet brand; it contains no condition making payment dependent on using that brand.

Halfway through construction, Bright demanded $70,000, saying lumber prices had risen. It supplied no details about the size or cause of the increase and threatened to stop. Ruth agreed because no replacement builder could finish before her family event.

Bright completed the kitchen with quartz counters and another cabinet brand. The substitute cabinets perform identically and have no measurable effect on the house’s value. The record does not explain why either substitution occurred.

Ruth says the appearance of granite was a central reason for the renovation. Replacing the counters costs $6,000, with no damage to other work, while the market-value difference between the promised and delivered kitchen is $500.

Ruth has paid $60,000. Bright sues for the additional $10,000, and Ruth counterclaims for the counter replacement.

Apply common-law contract principles, identifying any facts still needed.

Grading rubric (20 points)
IssuePointsWhat earns them
Governing law and scope2Treats the promised renovation as the service transaction specified by the question, identifies the express material and cabinet terms, and separates price modification from defective performance.
Additional compensation5Explains the existing duty, absence of new consideration, and Angel’s requirements of voluntary agreement, incomplete performance, unanticipated circumstances and fairness. Does not assume every price increase qualifies or is necessarily anticipated.
Completion and cabinet deviation3Uses Jacob & Youngs to examine purpose, excuse, intent and burden rather than inferring innocence or deliberate breach from the silent record. Notes the absence of an express payment condition and zero proved cabinet-value loss.
Countertop breach and damages baseline3Finds a deviation from the express granite promise and starts from compensation for promised performance, considering reasonable correction cost and market-value difference.
Competing measures and missing proof5Applies both Peevyhouse requirements, incidental purpose and gross disparity, and explains why a central aesthetic purpose and nondestructive correction matter. Compares Groves and Jacob & Youngs without treating willfulness or arithmetic alone as conclusive.
Conditional conclusions and accounting2Separately resolves the $10,000 demand and the $6,000 versus $500 counterclaim, with factual qualifications. Avoids adding both damage measures or charging the contract price twice.
Model answer

The contract expressly calls for granite and the named cabinet brand. Quartz therefore departs from the agreed countertop performance; no prior oral promise is needed to establish that term. The extra-price demand and remedies for substitutions require separate analysis.

Bright already owed completion for $60,000. Its promise to finish the same job supplies no new consideration for another $10,000 under the analysis in Alaska Packers. The original obligation must be identified before treating a new price agreement as a new exchange.

Angel offers a possible enforceability ground without new consideration when the parties voluntarily agree before either side has fully performed and the adjustment is fair in light of unanticipated circumstances. The timing requirement is satisfied here, but the other facts are underdeveloped. Ask what caused the price rise, what the parties had assumed, how it affected cost and whether the amount was proportionate.

The bare claim that lumber became more expensive does not establish those matters. Bright’s stop-work threat and Ruth’s lack of a timely alternative also weigh against treating the agreement as voluntary. On the stated record, Bright has not established its right to the additional $10,000; stronger proof of an unanticipated burden and a voluntary fair adjustment could change that conclusion.

Jacob & Youngs does not make every equivalent substitution permissible. It weighs the purpose of the specification, the excuse and character of the deviation, and the burden of correction. Here the cabinets have identical function and no proved market loss, but the record does not establish that their substitution was innocent; that fact should not be invented.

There is also no express condition making every payment contingent on the named brand.

For the counters, Ruth claims the $6,000 necessary to obtain the promised granite. Bright invokes the $500 market-value difference. The two figures are alternative measures for this defect, not amounts to add together.

A market appraisal may fail to capture a promised feature that served a central personal purpose.

Peevyhouse begins with completion cost and uses diminution when the breached work is incidental to the contract’s main purpose and completion cost is grossly disproportionate to the benefit. Ruth’s evidence that granite was central, and that correction would not destroy other work, challenges Bright’s reliance on that exception. Groves also resists equating the promised physical improvement with market value alone; Jacob & Youngs examines the waste of tearing apart completed work.

The record supports an argument for $6,000 if Ruth proves the importance of the promised feature and reasonable correction cost. Bright can argue that the benefit is adequately measured by $500, but a twelve-to-one ratio and an unproved assertion of innocent breach do not decide the issue automatically. The strongest conclusion rejects the extra-price claim on the present proof and gives a reasoned, jurisdiction-sensitive choice between the two countertop measures, without duplicating recovery.

Other defensible analysis

Separate the price from defective performance. Ruth has already paid $60,000, and Bright's additional demand depends on an enforceable modification, so proving that a cabinet substitution caused no measurable market loss would not itself establish the independent right to another $10,000 or make that additional sum the unpaid price of the original bargain. Keep the two accounts separate.

A price increase needs evidence. Stronger proof of the size and cause of the lumber rise could support the unanticipated-burden inquiry, but a contractor relying on Angel must still establish a voluntary and fair adjustment while performance remained due; the existence of an added cost cannot silently supply agreement, fairness and authority to stop performing the original obligation. The threat matters to voluntariness.

Do not invent innocence. If further facts show that the cabinet change was an accidental minor departure, the substantial-performance argument would have a premise missing from the stated record, while proof of a deliberate substitution would require confronting its significance under the governing rule instead of treating identical function as a complete defense to disregarding specifications. The contract contains no express payment condition.

Evaluate the counters on their own facts. Ruth's asserted aesthetic purpose and the absence of damage to other work support distinguishing a central promised feature from an incidental correction, but a model answer should still identify the evidence needed to establish that importance and the reasonableness of the replacement cost rather than treating her assertion as an already adjudicated fact. Bright may dispute those premises.

Diminution remains an arguable alternative. Credit a reasoned choice of $500 if the answer addresses the governing rule, the claimed role of granite and why correction would be disproportionate despite being nondestructive, without assuming the twelve-to-one comparison supplies every condition or that any deliberate breach automatically resolves the disagreement between Groves and Peevyhouse. Address both conditions of the latter's exception. Do not treat Peevyhouse as turning on a finding of nonwillful breach. Groves ordered a new trial; it did not award the entire completion estimate as a final quantified recovery.

The measures cannot be stacked. Awarding $6,000 to obtain the granite and another $500 for the same countertop deficiency would compensate the same defect twice, while adding the already paid contract price to either figure would require a separate legal basis not supplied merely by rejecting Bright's extra-charge theory. State the conditional counterclaim amount. Preserve the missing-proof qualifications.

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